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Global Media, Communication Technology, and the War on Terror 
 
James Castonguay 
Associate Professor and Chair 
Department of Media Studies and Digital Culture 
Sacred Heart University 
Email: CastonguayJ@sacredheart.edu 
From the telegraph, radio, film, and television to the Internet and mobile 
satellite networks, media and communication technologies have been integral to the waging and 
representation of war. Always eager to improve communications, surveillance, and weapons 
systems, military institutions have funded and developed new communication technologies and 
media since at least the 19th century, and journalism and entertainment have long been central 
to governments’ propaganda efforts. In the current context of the Iraq War and the “war on 
terror,” most accounts of international communication equate media with news (ignoring other 
genres) and often neglect the crucial role that audiences and newer technologies play within 
wartime global media culture. 
In an attempt to take advantage of the proliferation of satellite TV in Iraq previously outlawed 
under Saddam Hussein and widely available throughout the Middle East, the Bush administration 
and the Broadcasting Board of Governors (the presidentially appointed federal agency in charge 
of the U.S. propaganda efforts in Iraq) launched the Virginia-based satellite TV channel Alhurra 
(“The Free One”) in 2004 to “combat the anti-Americanism” of Arab satellite news channels, 
most prominently Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya. To defray the costs of Alhurra (and its Radio Sawa 
[“Radio Together”] counterpart), BBG chair and corporate media mogul, Norman Pattiz, 
drastically cut the Voice of America news staff and broadcasts in favor of a new mix of 
entertainment and journalism programming, confident that the entertainment would be a 
positive advertisement for the “American way of life” while also serving as an effective lead-in for 
news programming produced by the U.S. government. 
It has become clear that Alhurra arrived too late to matter given the already thriving pan-Arabic 
satellite TV market comprised of hundreds of channels that, along with the Internet, had already 
created a new Arab public sphere filled with contentious and passionate debate about Arab and 
Muslim identities, Saddam Hussein, democracy, and women’s rights. Consequently, the very 
naming of the channel “the free one” seems unconvincing to many Arab and Muslim viewers 
since the channel is completely government funded, unlike some other news sources available to 
pan-Arab audiences which are at least semi-independent. Thus, Alhurra has been deemed an 
ineffective, irrelevant, and counter-productive influence (from a U.S. standpoint) on public 
opinion because Arab and Muslim viewers dismiss and resist its messages as propaganda from 
the Bush administration. Some Muslim clerics issued written fatwas condemning the channel, and 
an Alhurra journalist and his son were targeted and killed by militia groups in 2005. 
Although there have been cultural and religious objections to satellite TV programs across the 
Middle East, the popular reality program, Terrorism in the Hands of Justice, has been more 
politically controversial within Iraq and less visible outside of the region. Broadcast six nights a 
week exclusively on the state-run and U.S. financed Al Iraqiya station in Iraq, each episode 
consists of trembling, bruised, and humiliated militia members confessing to kidnappings and 
murders without a lawyer present. The program’s popularity suggests it is a successful example 
of U.S. psychological operations and, similar to the long running U.S. program Cops, serves as 
effective propaganda for the counterinsurgent Iraqi police force. Although many Iraqis take the 
program as offering overwhelming evidence that insurgents are nothing more than hired hit men 
motivated by money and power, other Iraqis see it as a hypocritically unethical violation of basic 
human rights that is anathema to the principles of democracy and would not have been 
broadcast even under Saddam Hussein’s regime. The program has recently been the subject of a 
behind-the-scenes video critique that documents its vigilante techniques and lack of due process, 
and Human Rights Watch has condemned the program for its physical abuse and torture of 
suspected detainees. It has also been accused of encouraging sectarian divides by showing Shia 
officials interrogating and humiliating the overwhelmingly Sunni prisoners. 
The ongoing war in Iraq is the first major U.S. conflict in which the technological infrastructure of 
the Internet age facilitated the immediate and global distribution of text, images, video and 
multimedia from journalists, civilians, and combatants through the Internet, Web, and mobile 
satellite networks. Even representations of Saddam Hussein’s execution could not be efficiently 
“controlled” by the Bush administration as cell phone video of the hanging was leaked and shown 
on television and over the Web, including YouTube, where a version has already been viewed 
over 2.5 million times. Most recently, in December 2007, Al Qaeda solicited interview questions 
for Ayman al-Zawahri using Web forums, and in January 2008, Al Qaeda’s media division, Al 
Sahab, announced that its first batch of cell phone videos (always subtitled in English) were 
ready for downloading. YouTube.com and other Web sites distribute thousands of amateur videos 
from inside Iraq documenting civilian casualties, war crimes, corruption, and atrocities. Insurgent 
propaganda messages and videos of the murder of Western hostages by militia groups are 
readily available on the Web and over file sharing networks, as are videos from U.S. helicopter 
cockpits showing the killing of Iraqis (including the pilots’ reactions) along with daily translations 
of broadcasts from the major pan-Arab TV networks. 
It would thus be difficult to exaggerate the degree to which the existence of the Internet has 
complicated the U.S. government’s efforts to manage information within and outside the “theater 
of operations.” Indeed, the preference of the current Bush administration would no doubt have 
been to try to absent all images of suffering and death that have resulted from the 2003 Iraq 
War as was done during the 1991 Gulf War (with rare exceptions). In response to this new global 
communications environment, the Pentagon has implementing electronic warfare (EW) strategies 
outlined in the recently declassified Information Operations Roadmap commissioned and 
approved by Donald Rumsfeld in 2003. Approaching the Internet as an enemy “weapons 
system,” the Roadmap’s goal is to “[p]rovide a future EW capability sufficient to provide 
maximum control of the entire electromagnetic spectrum, denying, degrading, disrupting, or 
destroying the full spectrum of globally emerging communication systems, sensors, and weapons 
systems dependant on the electromagnetic spectrum.” A major focus in this regard is the ability 
to disable cell phones, which at times have been presented by the Pentagon and journalists as a 
sign of “progress” in Iraq, but are also commonly used as efficient remote detonators for 
roadside bombs (or IEDs), which can also be activated through Internet messaging applications. 
The Roadmap also calls for “improvements in PSYOP capability . . . to rapidly generate audience 
specific, commercial-quality products into denied areas” and “project . . . electronic attacks into 
denied areas by means of stealthy platforms.” One might conclude that the ultimate goal of the 
global information war on terror is to remove or control all non-U.S. communication and news 
from the designated regions. 
This brief overview suggests that we should not assume an outdated and reductive model of 
media imperialism or technological determinism toward an examination of global media, 
technology and war, since – the Information Operations Roadmap notwithstanding – a wide 
range of messages are being actively created and resisted in the Middle East, and technologies 
like the cell phone and the Internet are being put to a variety of uses from the beneficent (calling 
in suspected IEDs) to the violent (detonating them). Through a broad range and complex 
mixture of transnational and regional media –along with new technologies of distribution – there 
are consistent representations of the “American way of life” in addition to war images and 
information from all sides. 
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